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In 2000, 45% of federal defendants sentenced to prison were convicted of drug
oﬀenses. Legal scholars have criticized the federalization of drug prosecutions
for hindering state sovereignty and fairness. The expansion of federal jurisdic-
tion to drug crimes is controversial, because federal penalties tend to be more
severe than states penalties. In 2000, only 5% of federal defendants sentenced to
prison were convicted of importation or exportation of drugs. Thus, the inter-
vention of the federal government cannot be explained by its role in protecting
borders. In this paper we hypothesize that the federal government helps states
that are too poor or have too many other priorities to adequately deal with illicit
drugs. The empirical ﬁndings are consistent with the hypothesis that a higher
fraction of drug incarcerations are federal in states where more individuals favor
the de-criminalization of marijuana and in states with lower per-capita income.
Thus, federal prosecutions are allocated contrary to state preferences, due to the
negative national externalities with illicit drug use (JEL: K14, K42, H77.)
¤University of Alabama, Culverhouse College of Commerce & Business Administration, Department of
Economics and Finance, Tuscaloosa, AL 35487, rboylan@cba.ua.edu. I beneﬁted from discussions with Walt
Enders, Vivian Ho, Junsoo Lee, Cheryl Long, Paul Pecorino, David Reeb, Daniel Richman, Joe Smith, and
the participants of a seminar at Rice University. I also beneﬁted from the data analysis by Tim Perry and
Ling Shao.
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The expansion of federal jurisdiction to drug crimes has raised concerns among legal scholars,
because federal penalties are in general more severe than state penalties. The diﬀerence in
penalties hinders state sovereignty and fairness (Newbern [2000] and Clymer [1997]). As with
any other public good, if states diﬀer in preferences or in the cost of prosecution, then absent
externalities or cost savings, drug oﬀenders should be prosecuted by local jurisdictions [Oates,
1972]. It has further been suggested that federalization has been guided by the ambitions
of federal prosecutors instead of the public’s interest. For instance, Glaeser et al. [2000]
provide evidence that defendants are more likely to be prosecuted in federal court when
these prosecutions are personally beneﬁcial to an assistant U.S. attorney.
This paper considers the federalization of drug prosecution as a response to the negative
externalities caused by the manufacturing, importation, transportation and use of drugs.
The nature of the externality and its importance in explaining the federalization of the drug
war are discussed below. Externalities can be local or national. Local externalities refer to
the eﬀect of actions in one locality on outcomes in nearby localities. Local externalities can
arise from drug traﬃcking; for instance, drug traﬃcking in the inner cities may lead to more
drug use and less drug traﬃcking in the neighboring suburbs.
National externalities refer to the eﬀects of actions in a locality on outcomes in the entire
nation. National externalities may arise due to the nature of production, distribution, and
transportation of drugs. For instance, Appalachia grows two-ﬁfths of the nation’s supply
of marijuana, and exports much of it to the Northeast (Clines [2000]), while in the early
1980s, the Lower East Side of New York City supplied heroin for the Northeast (Raab
[1984]). A further source of national externalities results from ﬁxed costs of establishing
drug importation and distribution networks. Hence, widespread use of drugs leads to complex
networks that lower the average price of purchasing drugs everywhere in the United States.1
1Alternatively, given a ﬁxed level of prosecutorial resources, more drug sales lead to a decrease in the
ratio of seizures to quantity of cocaine produced and thus a reduced price of drugs (Rydell and Everingham
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nation.
National externalities may also arise due to the nature of preferences for drug control in
a population. In 1996, 82% of Americans thought that illegal drug use was a “big problem”
for society, although only 27% saw it as a “big problem” in their own local community.2
Further, 72% of the population saw drug use as “changing the national character,” with
50% believing it represents a “fundamental breakdown in the country’s morals.” Finally, the
largest share of the public strongly supported more severe penalties for the possession and
sale of drugs. Thus, current dug policies can be explained by the presence of other citizens’
drug use in individual Americans’ utility functions. This, in turn, can be modelled as a
national negative externality in drug use.3
The federalization of drug prosecutions is not explained by local externalities, because
local externalities in drug oﬀenses are just as likely to be negative as positive. Presumably,
increases in the likelihood of being prosecuted in one locality lead traﬃckers to move to
an adjacent area with a lower likelihood of prosecution. Voters are unlikely to agree to
use federal resources to reduce the drug traﬃcking problems in inner cities if this leads the
traﬃckers to move their operations to the suburbs. In general, as shown in Helsley and
Strange [forthcoming], it is diﬃcult to justify the federalization of criminal prosecution with
the existence of local externalities.4
The federalization of drug prosecution is explained by the existence of national external-
ities in drug oﬀenses. Lack of eradications and less patrolling of highways create negative
[1994]).
2The information in this paragraph is taken from Blandon and Young [1998].
3Economists have argued that current drug control policies are not cost eﬀective and should be replaced
by the legalization and taxation of illicit drugs (Becker et al. [2002], Kuzienko and Levitt [2003], Miron and
Zweibel [1995]). Thus, in addition to wanting to limit drug use, individuals have preferences for limiting
drug use in a manner which many not be cost eﬀective. This paper takes as given the public’s preferences
for imprisoning drug oﬀenders. We then examine whether the public’s preferences are consistent with the
observed mix of state vs. federal incarcerations.
4Helsley and Strange [forthcoming] examine whether private and public policing can co-exist. Although
they do not explicitly discuss federalization, public policing can be interpreted as policing by the national
government, while private policing can be interpreted as policing by the state and local governments.
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production, importation, and distribution networks to take into account the national exter-
nalities of drug prosecution.5 Thus national negative externalities explain why the federal
government should have a greater role in drug prosecutions along points of importation.
Further, national externalities explain why wealthier states with well functioning criminal
justice systems can ﬁnd it more beneﬁcial to spend resources to reduce drug traﬃcking out-
side their state than to spend additional resources in their own state. For instance, West
Virginia does not have full-time state prosecutors (Committee on Government Operations
[1994]). Thus a large percentage of drug prosecutions in that state are conducted by federal
prosecutors.
Decentralized decisions on the resources to spend in combating drug oﬀenses is also
ineﬃcient if states disagree on the importance of limiting drug use. According to Blandon
and Young [1998], Americans worry about illicit drugs because of their linkage to high rates
of crime, their negative eﬀect on national character and morality, and the harmful health
consequences of drugs for communities and individuals. These concerns are likely to vary
across states, and states that are not as concerned about drug use are less likely to strictly
enforce drug laws despite the negative eﬀect this has on other states.
The manner in which federal drug expenditures are allocated provides further indirect
evidence that negative national externalities explain the federalization of drug traﬃcking. In
several instances, drug control by the federal government requires matching state contribu-
tions. For instance, the federal government gives Byrne grants that require matching state
funding. Further, the federal government assists local authorities in using federal forfeiture
statutes, and organizes drug traﬃcking around federal/state task forces that require state
and local commitment of resources (see Blumenson and Nilsen [1998], 21 U.S.C. x1706).
According to Fiscal Federalism, matching grants should be used when the provision of the
5Qunitanilla [1997] discusses the removal from oﬃce of a District Attorney in Kansas who drained local
resources by convicting drug traﬃckers along the interstate.
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in the extent of the spillover [Oates, 1999]. Hence, the requirement of matching funds is con-
sistent with the government intervening eﬃciently and drug traﬃcking generating national
externalities.
A model formalizes the intuition provided in this introduction. In particular it is shown
that a higher fraction of drug prosecutions are federal in districts where individuals are not
strongly opposed to drug use.6 This paper provides empirical evidence consistent with this
conclusion. In particular, it is shown that in districts where a higher fraction of adults
favor de-criminalization of marijuana, a higher fraction of individuals convicted to prison
terms for drug oﬀenses are convicted in the federal courts. Further, a higher fraction of drug
imprisonments are federal in poorer districts and districts that are points of importation.
This paper extends the literature on the role of the federal government. Externalities
in drug use lead federal policies to oﬀset local policies. These results stand in contrast to
Scholz et al. [1991], Knight [2002] and Strumpf and Oberholzer-Gee [2002]. Scholz et al.
[1991] ﬁnd that counties with Democratic members of Congress have a higher level of Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) enforcement. Knight [2002] provides
evidence consistent with the federal government giving more highway grants to states who
value highways more.7 Strumpf and Oberholzer-Gee [2002] ﬁnd that states with more di-
verse preferences about liquor policies are less likely to restrict county liquor laws. These
diﬀerences can be explained by the nature of the externalities. Poor drug traﬃcking control
is more likely to aﬀect the rest of the nation than poor occupational standards, bad state
highways, or lax liquor policies.8
6A district is a subdivision of a state. The U.S. states are divided into 90 districts. Hence, on average, a
state is split into two districts.
7Unobserved preferences for highway spending explain the observed positive relation between federal and
state highway spending. One can infer this result by noting that when the author instruments for federal
spending, increases in federal spending lead to reduced state expenditures on highway construction.
8Externalities may still exist in occupational standards, state highways, and liquor policies. For instance,
[Strumpf and Oberholzer-Gee, 2002, page 6] assume that there are positive externalities in uniformity of
liquor laws.
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and the number of drug convictions. Section 3 analyzes empirically the relation between
states’ preferences for drug control and convictions. The Appendix includes sources and
tables.
2 Model
A game relates the degree of federalization of drug prosecutions to district preferences for
drug traﬃcking. In this section, a district refers to a state or a local jurisdiction. In the
game the players are the national government and the governments of each district. In
the ﬁrst stage of the game, the national and district governments learn the preferences
for drug prosecution in each district. In the second stage, the federal government selects
a matching rule for each district. In the third stage, district oﬃcials select the level of
district expenditures on drug prosecutions. In the fourth stage, federal expenditures on drug
prosecution in each district are determined by the district expenditures and the matching
rule.
By convention, Greek letters denote parameters, Roman letters denote variables, and
all parameters and variables are positive. Speciﬁcally, p denotes the fraction of the district
population that uses drugs, and cd and cf are the fraction of the population in a district
convicted for drug oﬀenses by district and federal prosecutors. District expenditures on drug
convictions are assumed to equal ·cd. National availability of drugs is denoted by ˆ p and is
a function of the availability of drugs in each district. Further, district drug preferences are
parameterized by t. In districts with a high values of t, individuals are less likely to use
drugs and are more likely to support prosecution of drug oﬀenses. In general, preferences
for use and prosecution diﬀer. However, it will be seen in the empirical section of this paper
that diﬀerences in preferences for prosecution and use are diﬃcult to identify. Finally, the
decisions made in a district are modelled as minimizing the welfare losses from drug use and
6
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It is assumed that





2 + ·cd: (2)
Equation (1) states that the number of drug users is decreasing in the number of drug
convictions and individuals’ distaste for drug use, while increasing in the national availability
of drugs. Clearly, the relation between convictions and drug use cannot be linear for the
entire range of parameters; hence, the model is to viewed as holding only for the relevant
range of the variables. The national negative externalities in drug consumption are ±ˆ p. As
discussed in the introduction, drug externalities take many forms and here we choose to
focus on the national negative externalities of drug use.9
Equation (2) states that losses from drug traﬃcking are increasing in drug use, distaste
for drug use, and state expenditures on drug convictions.10 The matching rule selected
by the national government is denoted x(t). Finally, the number of federal convictions is
determined as cf = x(t)cd.
Suppose that districts with high levels of drug use have particularly detrimental eﬀects
9To model national externalities in preferences, assume that:




tp2 + ±ˆ p + ·cd: (4)
This model leads to the same conclusions as the model examined in the paper.
10The weight given to drug use, t, is going to be a function of the preferences of voters in the district. The
exact weighting can be given by a voting model. Alternatively, one can assume that the district authorities
want to maximize expenditures on drug prosecutions, but are more successful at achieving their goals in
districts where voters are unfavorably predisposed towards drug use. Note that the loss function for the
district does not account for the cost of federal prosecutions. Let Cf be the fraction of the U.S. population
convicted by federal prosecutors for drug oﬀenses. Let ² be the fraction of U.S. tax revenue paid by the




tp2 + ±ˆ p + ·cd + ²Cf: (5)
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optimal matching policy reduces diﬀerences across states in drug use. For simplicity, we
assume that the matching rule is selected to minimize federal expenditures while ensuring
that drug use in each state is p or lower. The parameter ±, the distribution of the parameter
t, and the cost of federal convictions determine the exact value of p.
Proposition 1 (1) The fraction of drug convictions that are federal is decreasing in state
preferences for drug enforcement, t. (2) Drug use, p, is decreasing in t. (3) The number of
federal drug convictions is decreasing in t. (4) The number of state drug convictions can be
increasing or decreasing in t.
Proof Since
p = 1 ¡ ®(1 + x)cd ¡ °t + ±ˆ p;
cd =







= ¡tp®(1 + x) + ·:





Since the federal government seeks to keep drug use at p, cf = 0 if ·



















0 if t > ·
p®
·



















t® if t > ·
p®
p if t < ·
p®;
drug use is decreasing in t.
Let t < ·



























Hence, the number of federal convictions is decreasing in t.
11More precisely, the fraction of drug convictions is non-increasing in t.
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The model presented in Section 2 leads to testable hypotheses. Speciﬁcally, the model
suggests that the number of federal convictions is a function of the parameter t, which
denotes individuals’ preferences for drug enforcement. Unfortunately, there are no measures
of preferences for drug enforcement available at the district level. However, information
on several characteristics which should inﬂuence preferences for drug enforcement exists
in survey data. One can use the survey data to estimate the association between various
population characteristics and attitudes towards illicit drugs. The estimates can then be
used to predict drug preferences as a function of population characteristics in each district.
Survey data on whether marijuana should be de-criminalized is used to proxy for district
preferences for drug policy. Speciﬁcally, the survey data is used to estimate the following
model:
Probability(individual i favors legalization of marijuana) = F(individual i’s characteristics); (6)
where the characteristics of an individual include age and religious aﬃliation. The function
F estimated in Equation (3) is used to compute:
1 ¡ t = F(district characteristics); (7)
where district characteristics include the fraction of the population in a district of a particular
age group and religious aﬃliation. Note that high values of t correspond to a low fraction of
the population favoring de-criminalization of marijuana.
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number of federal drug convictions
number of drug convictions
= fr(t, controls)
number of drug users per capita = fdr(t, controls)
number of federal drug convictions = ff(t, controls)
number of district drug convictions = fd(t, controls);




@t < 0, and
@ff
@t < 0, and
@fd
@t ? 0.
The ﬁrst regression is likely to yield the most robust results, since dividing by the total
number of convictions accounts for some of the unobserved district characteristics. For-
mally, let x be the observed independent variables and w the unobserved independent vari-
ables. Suppose the unobserved variables aﬀect federal and state convictions multiplicatively:
ff(t;x;w) = gf(t;x)h(w) and fd(t;x;w) = gd(t;x)h(w). Then, fr(t;x) =
gf(t;x)
gf(t;x)+gd(t;x) does
not depend on the unobserved independent variables.
The remaining control variables in the drug conviction regressions account for factors
discussed below. As discussed in the introduction, one expects more federal prosecutions
in low per-capita income and border districts. Political factors may also lead the federal
government to redistribute income from states that have few senators per capita to states
that have many senators per capita (i.e., to less populated states).12 This suggests that
less populated states receive a greater per capita share of federal expenditures on drug
enforcement. Finally, Boylan [forthcoming] has shown that districts with a more experienced
U.S. attorney have more federal convictions.13 Hence, one expects a higher percentage of
drug conviction to be federal in districts with more experienced U.S. attorneys.
12See Atlas et al. [1995]. The eﬀect of Senate representation depends on whether the unit of analysis is
the congressional district versus a state and the type of government expenditures (Levitt and Snyder [1995],
Lee [1998]).
13The U.S. attorney is the chief federal prosecutor in a district.
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instance, one may expect a higher number of federal drug convictions in districts with more
federal and fewer state prosecutors. The reason for not including these variables is that they
are the dependent variables in the model. The number of federal drug convictions is a proxy
for all federal drug expenditures, which includes the number of federal prosecutors.
3.1 Data
The survey data was collected by the National Opinion Research Center’s General Social
Survey. Since 1975, the General Social Survey has collected public opinion data on individ-
ual’s view towards the legalization of marijuana as well as information about the individual’s
race, religion, political aﬃliation, and conservatism.14
To estimate preferences for drug enforcement, the following variables are used. The polit-
ical aﬃliation of a state is measured by the political aﬃliation of members of the state house
and the state senate.15 The population, racial composition, population density, and income
per capita for each county are obtained from the Area Resource File, which is maintained
by the Department of Health and Human Services. The church membership by county is
obtained from the Glenmary Research Center. Finally, measures for liberalism for each state
are taken from Berry et al. [1998]. The authors ﬁrst measure the liberalism of each member
of the U.S. Congress by analyzing their votes. Measures of liberalism of a state are computed
using the measures of liberalism of the representatives and their vote shares at elections.
To estimate the eﬀects of district preferences on drug enforcement, the number of federal
drug imprisonments are obtained from the Administrative oﬃce of U.S. courts. Because
the data is only available aggregated at the federal judicial district, for all regressions the
unit of observation is a district.16 The study focuses on imprisonments because this is the
14Individuals were asked their opinion on the legalization of marijuana in the following years: 1983-84,
1986-91, 1993-94, 1996, 1998, 2000.
15The data set was compiled by Carl Klarner, “Measurement of Partisan Balance of State Government.”
The data can be downloaded at http://www.unl.edu/SPPQ/journal datasets.html.
16A federal judicial district is a subset of a state. There are 94 districts in the United States. Since 1996,
12
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The number of state imprisonments is obtained from the National Corrections Reporting
Program and is aggregated at the district and year. More details on the data and on the
sampling rules are found in Kuzienko and Levitt [2003].
The number of individuals who die because of drug use is used as a proxy for the number
of individuals who use drugs. This number is computed using the ‘Multiple cause of death
in the United States’ data set.17 This is the only proxy for drug use that is available for
each state and each year [Wysowski et al., 1993]. A second proxy for drug use is the data
from the Monitoring of the Future survey of high school seniors. This survey does not give
representative samples at the district level and is not available for all districts and years.
Further, drug deaths are likely to be more highly correlated with heavy drug than high
school use. This is important because heavy users account for the larger fraction of national
drug consumption and hence for the national drug externalities considered in this study. For
instance, heavy drug users account for 70% of the reported cocaine consumed [Everingham
et al., 1995, page 309]. Nonetheless, with both proxies, the empirical estimates are consistent
with the predictions of the theoretical model.
The variable ‘Border district’ is used to control for districts that are foreign importation
points. The variable is coded ‘1’ if the district is one of the following: southern district
of California (San Diego), central district of California (Los Angeles), district of Arizona,
district of New Mexico, western district of Texas (San Antonio), southern district of Texas
(Houston), southern district of Florida (Miami), eastern district of New York (Brooklyn),
and southern district of New York (Manhattan).18
the Administrative oﬃce of U.S. courts provides the data at the county level. In Section 3.4, the regressions
are re-estimated at the county level for this restricted number of years.
17Causes of death are reported on death certiﬁcation by physicians, medical examiners, or coroners. This
information is forwarded to the National Center for Health Statistics who codes the information according
to the rules of the International Classiﬁcation of Diseases (ICD). The ninth edition of the ICD (ICD-9) was
used from 1979 to 1998. More details on the data are found in Boylan and Ho [2003].
18A justiﬁcation for the choice of these districts follows. According to Oﬃce of National Drug Control
Policy [2000], heroin is imported through the states of New York, New Jersey, Florida, California, Arizona,
and Texas.
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A model of preferences for drug enforcement is estimated using the responses to the following
question from the National Opinion Research Center’s General Social Survey:
Some people think the use of marijuana should be made legal. Other people
think marijuana use should not be made legal. Which do you favor?
Table 1 describes the characteristics of the sample. Protestants are split into Baptists, other
Protestant denominations (Methodists, Presbyterians, Episcopalians, and Lutherans), and
non-denominational Protestants (the rest). In Table 2, Regression (1), ordinary least squares
is used to estimate an individual’s attitude towards legalizing marijuana as a function of the
characteristics of an individual. Independents, blacks, liberals, 18-24 year olds, unemployed
individuals, and those without religious aﬃliation are most likely to support the legalization
of marijuana. The regression also includes year and region ﬁxed eﬀects. The year ﬁxed
eﬀects are graphed in Figure 1.
The model of federalization of drug prosecutions assumes that public opinion towards
drug policing is positively correlated with individuals’ use of drugs. Speciﬁcally, in districts
where individuals are more likely to use drugs, individuals are also less likely to prefer strict
drug policing. The validity of this hypothesis is examined using the National Household
Survey on Drug Abuse which is conducted by the National Institute on Drug Abuse. The
data used is for individuals 18 years and older for the years 1982, 1990, and 1995. Summary
A numerical measure for ‘Border district’ is computed by weighting the number of drug traﬃckers from
a country by the proportion of non-immigrants from that country that arrive in a particular city. For
instance, the weighted number of non-immigrants coming to Miami = (Number of Mexican drug traﬃckers)
£ (Number of Mexican non-immigrants coming to Miami)/(Number of Mexican non-immigrants coming to
all U.S. ports) + (Number of Colombian drug traﬃckers) £ (Number of Colombian non-immigrants coming
to Miami)/(Number of Colombian non-immigrants coming to all U.S. ports), :::. The number of individuals
entering U.S. federal prisons for drug traﬃcking that are from a particular country is used as the proxy for
the number of drug traﬃckers from that particular country.
Using the data from the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service [1999] and The Bureau of Justice
Statistics [1997], the ﬁve cities with this highest weighted number of immigrants are: Miami (1412), Los
Angeles (520), New York (496), Houston (432), Chicago (168).
For these reasons ‘Border district’ is taken to be all district that border with Mexico, New York City, Los
Angeles, and Miami.
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variable is whether an individual reports to have ever used marijuana, cocaine, heroin, or
hallucinogens. In Regression (3) the response is whether the individual reports to have used
marijuana, cocaine, heroin, or hallucinogens at least four times in the last 30 days.19 The
same individual characteristics explain opinion towards legalization of marijuana, occasional
and heavy drug use.20
The estimates of Regression (1) in Table 2 are used to estimate the percentage of indi-
viduals who favor the legalization of marijuana in each year and district.21 The sources for
the data on the fraction of the population of a political aﬃliation, race, and religion and
the average level of conservatism are listed in Table 4.22 Table 5 gives the correspondence
between the survey variables and the state variables. The imputed values for the percentage
of the population that favors the legalization of marijuana vary from 16% (Nebraska in 1990)
to 48% (Oregon in 1999).
3.3 Results
In estimating the determinants of drug use, the unit of observation is the federal judicial
district during a year. The years analyzed are 1983 through 1999. Table 6 provides sum-
19Except for the population size, the coding of the variables is consistent across survey. For the General
Social Survey, population size is the size of the place the survey is administered is 1000s. For the National
Household Survey on Drug Abuse 1982, ¡5 denotes the individual resides in a rural area, ¡4 in a village,
¡3 in suburbs, ¡2 in a town, ¡1 in a city. For the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse 1990 and
1995, ¡5 denotes an area not in an SMSA and in a rural area, ¡4 not in an SMSA and not in a rural area,
¡3 fewer than 250;000 person in the SMSA, ¡2 between 250,000 and 999,999 in the SMSA, ¡1 more than
one million inhabitants in the SMSA.
20The exceptions are the following. Individuals between 25 and 44 are less likely to favor the legalization
of marijuana and be heavy drug users compared to 18 to 25 year olds, but more likely to have used drugs
at least once in their life. Individuals with four or more years of college education are more likely to favor
decriminalization of marijuana, more likely to have used drugs, but less likely to be heavy users. Blacks are
less likely to favor legalization of marijuana and have ever used drugs, but more likely to be heavy users.
21The set of variables used to estimate preferences for legalization of marijuana are very similar to set
used in Strumpf and Oberholzer-Gee [2002] to estimate the preferences for permitting the sale of liquor.
22The state liberalism measure is re-scaled because its range is 0 (most conservative) to 100 (most liberal),
while the General Social Survey conservatism measure ranges from 1 (most liberal) to 7 (most conservative).
Similarly, the population density variable is re-scaled to match the range of the population size variable in
the General Social Survey.
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drug imprisonments that are federal, drug deaths, high school drug use, federal and state
imprisonments on state preferences and controls. The regressions adjust for the serial corre-
lation in the errors by estimating a ﬁrst-order autoregressive model with year ﬁxed-eﬀects.
Unobserved heterogeneity among districts is accounted for by district-level random eﬀects.
It can be seen that in districts that are more tolerant of drug use, a higher percentage of
drug convictions are federal. The estimated coeﬃcients imply that a one standard deviation
in the proportion of the population that favors the legalization of marijuana increases the
percentage of convictions that are federal by 15%. Further, consistent with the results in
the model, the number of drug deaths is higher in districts that are more tolerant of drug
use (Regression 2). In Regression (3), the dependent variable is the fraction of high school
seniors who have used an illicit drug. As predicted, in districts with a higher fraction of the
population favoring the legalization of marijuana, a higher percentage of high school seniors
have used an illegal drug. The coeﬃcient for ‘Public opinion’ in Regressions (4) and (5)
imply that districts more tolerant of drug use have more federal and fewer state convictions,
although the coeﬃcients are not statistically signiﬁcant.
A key variable that is not included in the model of drug prosecutions and drug preferences
is an individual’s income. Since 1972, the General Social Survey has not changed the coding
of income, so that in 1998, 63.5% of responders reported that their income was in the
interval ‘$25,000 or over;’ thus the coarseness of the variables makes it of little use. In
the regressions in Table 7, the variable ‘Income per capita’ is thus likely to capture both
redistribution of income (from wealthier states to poorer states) and the fact that higher
income individuals are more likely to use drugs (see Grossman and Chaloupka [1998]). Hence,
consistent with the redistribution of income, districts with higher income per capita have
more state imprisonments and fewer federal imprisonments. Consistent with drugs being a
normal good, higher-per-capita-income districts have more drug deaths.
Consistent with political theories on the distribution of federal expenditures, districts
16
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eral. Further, border districts and districts with an experienced U.S. attorney have a higher
percentage of drug imprisonments that are federal. Finally, the strong degree autocorrelation
(½) highlight the importance of accounting for the serial correlation in the data.
3.4 Robustness checks
It is possible that the model used to predict preferences for drug enforcement is incorrect.
For this reason, in Table 8 the regressions are re-run using the variables used to estimate
drug preferences instead of the variable ‘public opinion.’ The table includes in parentheses
the predicted value of the coeﬃcients for regressions (1)-(4). For instance, according to
the model of preferences for drug enforcement, a higher percentage of Democrats in a state
increases preferences for drug control. According to the model of optimal federalization of
drug enforcement, higher preferences for drug enforcement lead to less federalization, less
drug use, and fewer federal drug imprisonments. The predictions for the number of state
imprisonments is ambiguous. Hence, the model predicts that the ﬁrst four coeﬃcients in the
row ‘Democrat’ are negative.
In Regression (1), the dependent variable is the percentage of imprisonments that are
federal. The only variables in this regression that are statistically signiﬁcant are: ‘Percentage
black’ and ‘Conservatism.’ The sign of both variables is as predicted in the model. Most
coeﬃcient in the regressions in Table 8 are statistically insigniﬁcant, perhaps because of
multicollinearity. [Greene, 2000, page 258] suggests that condition numbers greater than 20
are indicative of a multicollinearity problem. For the regression in Table 8 the condition
number is 307, while for the regressions in Table 7 the condition number is 11.6.
In Regression (2), the dependent variable is ‘Drug Deaths.’ ‘Democrat,’ ‘Republican,’
‘Catholic,’ ‘Baptist,’ and ‘Denominational protestant’ are statistically signiﬁcant and of the
predicted sign. The variables ‘Less than nine years of education’ and ‘Unemployment rate’
are statistically signiﬁcant but not of the predicted sign. The wrong sign can be explained
17
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conditions.
The eﬀect of the control variables remains unchanged. Speciﬁcally, districts with more
senators per capita, lower per capita income, border districts, and districts with an experi-
enced U.S. attorney have a higher percentage of drug convictions that are federal. Hence, the
re-distributional properties of federalization are robust to functional speciﬁcation. Further,
multicollinearity in the variables used to measure preferences for drug policies suggests that
a model be used to rank districts according to their propensity to favor the prosecutions of
drug oﬀenders; i.e., a model similar to the one constructed in Section 3.2.
Another concern is that the variable ‘Border’ may not properly account for the proportion
of federal cases that cannot be prosecuted at the state level. For this reason, Regressions (1)
in Table 7 is re-run excluding drug traﬃcking cases that involve import and exports of drugs.
None of the results change. Districts with a higher fractions of (non-import/export) drug
imprisonments that are federal are districts where public opinion is more favorable towards
decriminalization of marijuana, per capita income is low, senators per capita is high, are
points of importation, and have more experienced U.S. attorneys.
The serial correlation in the data was taken into account by assuming an AR(1) error
structure. This assumption is very restrictive; in particular it assumes that all districts have
the same autoregressive process. The linear regression model with robust standard errors
clustered at the district level was estimated to provide estimates that account for arbitrary
serial correlation [Wooldridge, 2002, page 152]. The estimates remain unchanged. Namely,
districts more prone toward marijuana decriminalization, with more senators per capita,
lower per capita income, border districts, and districts with an experienced U.S. attorney
have a higher percentage of drug convictions that are federal. Since this estimator is less
eﬃcient, the signiﬁcance level for the variable is decreased and the coeﬃcients for ‘Border’
and ‘U.S. attorney experience’ are signiﬁcant at only the 10% conﬁdence level.23
23A dynamic model is a more general speciﬁcation for the autocorrelation in the error process than the
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another potential source of misspeciﬁcation. The Hausman test for Regression (1) in Table 7
results in a test statistics of 5.64 (with a corresponding p-value of 0.23 for the Â2 distribution
with four degrees of freedom). Thus, one cannot reject the hypothesis that the unobserved
district eﬀects are independent from the explanatory variables.
Since 1996, the number of federal imprisonments is available at the county level from the
Administrative Oﬃce of U.S. Courts. To further test the robustness of the results, for the
years 1996 through 1999, the regressions are estimated at the county level. For most counties
and years, the number of federal drug incarceration and the number of drug deaths are zero.
For this reason a Tobit model is considered instead of the linear regression model when
the dependent variable is the percent of drug imprisonments that are federal. A Poisson
model (weighted by the population in a county) is used to estimate the regression when the
dependent variables are the number of drug deaths, the number of federal imprisonments,
and the number of state imprisonments. Year ﬁxed-eﬀects and county random-eﬀects are
included in all regression. Table 9 contains summary statistics for the data. The imputed
values for the percentage of the population that favors the legalization of marijuana vary
from 9% (Cimarron County, OK; 1996) to 55% (New York County, NY; 1998).
The results of the county Tobit and Poisson regressions are consistent with the prediction
in the theoretical model.24 Speciﬁcally, in counties where individuals favor the decriminal-
ization of marijuana, a greater fraction of drug imprisonments are federal, there are more
drug deaths, and there are more federal imprisonments (Table 10).
As discussed in Section 3, per capita income is likely to aﬀect drug use and federal
government assistance. Consistent with Fiscal Federalism, in states with higher per capita
income, a lower fraction of imprisonments are federal. Further, in counties with higher per
AR(1) process. Including the lag of the percentage of imprisonments that are federal does not change the
result for Regressions (1) in Table 7, but makes the coeﬃcient for the variable ‘Public opinion’ insigniﬁcant.
However, a common factors test [Greene, 2000, page 552] can be used to show that the restrictions in the
coeﬃcients implied by the AR(1) process cannot be rejected at the 10% signiﬁcant level.
24Similar results are obtained if the Tobit model is used for all regressions.
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re-estimated in Table 11 with the variables that are used to estimate drug preferences. Again,
the results are by and large consistent with the predictions in the model of federalization
and state preferences.
This study has focused in the federalization of drug crimes. However, similar explanations
as the ones provided in this paper can be used to explain the federalization of all crimes.
Suppose the dependent variables is the ratio of all non-drug federal imprisonments over the
sum of all non-drug imprisonments. Then, districts with a higher fractions of non-drug
imprisonments that are federal are districts with individuals favorably predisposed toward
the decriminalization of marijuana, with higher per capita income, with more experiences
U.S. attorneys, and in states that are less populated. The eﬀects of public opinion and per
capita income are however statistically insigniﬁcant. The results are consistent with other
crimes not having the same degree of national externalities as drug traﬃcking.
4 Conclusion
This study takes an individuals’ preferences for drug prosecution as given and examines
whether the federal/state mix in convictions is eﬃcient. The model predicts more federal
drug traﬃcking convictions in districts where individuals are not as committed to drug con-
victions. The federal government thus accounts for the negative externalities not considered
in state and local decision-making. The empirical evidence is largely consistent with this
prediction.
A large body of literature has suggested that the current level of drug convictions is not
cost eﬀective (Becker et al. [2002], Kuzienko and Levitt [2003], Miron and Zweibel [1995]).
The analysis in the paper can be extended to alternative drug strategies. For instance,
consider drug treatment policies. If successful, these policies reduce drug use and thus
reduce negative externalities in other localities. Alternatively, consider the system where
20
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art3narcotics are legal but taxed. Then, higher taxes and greater eﬀorts to limit tax avoidance
lead to lower negative externalities for other localities. Hence, regardless of the drug control
strategy, the national government has a role in internalizing these externalities, and the
federal role in drug control is greater in localities where individuals are not as opposed to
illicit drug use.
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1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Year
The numbers correspond to the year ﬁxed-eﬀects for Regression (1) in Table 2. This is the
likelihood that a young, employed, white, independent from the Paciﬁc region with no
religious aﬃliation supports the decriminalization of marijuana.
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Legalize Marijuana 0.23 0.42 0 1 16654
Democrat 0.37 0.48 0 1 16654
Republican 0.28 0.45 0 1 16654
Population size 3.6 11.96 0 78.95 16654
Age between 25 and 44 0.46 0.5 0 1 16654
Age between 45 and 64 0.27 0.44 0 1 16654
Age 65 or older 0.18 0.38 0 1 16654
Less than 9 years education 0.07 0.25 0 1 16654
4 years college or more 0.22 0.41 0 1 16654
Black 0.14 0.34 0 1 16654
Other race 0.04 0.19 0 1 16654
Unemployed 0.03 0.16 0 1 16654
Conservatism 4.15 1.35 1 7 16654
Jewish 0.02 0.14 0 1 16654
Catholic 0.24 0.43 0 1 16654
Non-denom. Protestant 0.18 0.38 0 1 16654
Baptist 0.21 0.41 0 1 16654
Denominat. Protestant 0.23 0.42 0 1 16654
New England 0.05 0.22 0 1 16654
Middle Atlantic 0.14 0.35 0 1 16654
East North Central 0.18 0.38 0 1 16654
West North Central 0.08 0.28 0 1 16654
South Atlantic 0.18 0.39 0 1 16654
East South Central 0.07 0.26 0 1 16654
West South Central 0.09 0.28 0 1 16654
Mountain 0.06 0.24 0 1 16654
Paciﬁc 0.13 0.34 0 1 16654
1983 0.04 0.21 0 1 16654
1984 0.08 0.27 0 1 16654
1986 0.08 0.27 0 1 16654
1987 0.1 0.3 0 1 16654
1989 0.06 0.23 0 1 16654
1989 0.06 0.23 0 1 16654
1990 0.05 0.22 0 1 16654
1991 0.06 0.23 0 1 16654
1993 0.06 0.23 0 1 16654
1994 0.11 0.31 0 1 16654
1996 0.1 0.31 0 1 16654
1998 0.1 0.3 0 1 16654
2000 0.1 0.3 0 1 16654
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Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic PressTable 2: Regression estimates of the probability an individual supports the de-criminalizing
of marijuana, has ever used drug, is currently a heavy drug user






Population size .001 .013 .005
(.0003)¤¤¤ (.002)¤¤¤ (.001)¤¤¤
Age between 25 and 44 -.042 .033 -.034
(.011)¤¤¤ (.008)¤¤¤ (.004)¤¤¤
Age between 45 and 64 -.092 -.241 -.074
(.012)¤¤¤ (.011)¤¤¤ (.005)¤¤¤
Age 65 or older -.14 -.344 -.078
(.013)¤¤¤ (.014)¤¤¤ (.007)¤¤¤
Less than 9 years education -.028 -.175 -.017
(.013)¤ (.012)¤¤¤ (.006)¤¤
4 years college or more .036 .03 -.019
(.008)¤¤¤ (.008)¤¤¤ (.004)¤¤¤
Black -.015 -.071 .007
(.01) (.008)¤¤¤ (.004)¤
Other race -.113 -.145 -.023
(.017)¤¤¤ (.016)¤¤¤ (.008)¤¤
















Legalize Marijuana Drug Use Heavy Use
(1) (2) (3)
Const. .722 .452 .101
(.017)¤¤¤ (.01)¤¤¤ (.005)¤¤¤
Obs. 16654 23553 23553
R2 .091 .1 .023
Notes: All regressions include year and regional dummies. The reference category for
political aﬃliation is ‘Independent or other party.’ The reference category for religion
aﬃliation is ‘No religious aﬃliation or other religion.’ The reference category for the region
is ‘Paciﬁc.’ The reference year for the survey is 2000. ¤ signiﬁcant at the 5% level; ¤¤
signiﬁcant at the 1% level; ¤¤¤ signiﬁcant at the 0:1% level.
Table 3: Summary statistics for National Household Survey on Drug Abuse
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Ever used drugs 0.35 0.48 0 1 23553
Heavy drug user 0.05 0.22 0 1 23553
Population size -2.05 1.39 -5 -1 23553
Age between 25 and 44 0.58 0.49 0 1 23553
Age between 45 and 64 0.13 0.34 0 1 23553
Age 65 or older 0.06 0.24 0 1 23553
Black 0.21 0.41 0 1 23553
Other race 0.04 0.19 0 1 23553
Less than 9 years education 0.08 0.27 0 1 23553
4 years college or more 0.16 0.37 0 1 23553
Unemployed 0.06 0.23 0 1 23553
New England 0.03 0.18 0 1 23553
Middle Atlantic 0.14 0.35 0 1 23553
East North Central 0.13 0.34 0 1 23553
West North Central 0.06 0.23 0 1 23553
South Atlantic 0.22 0.42 0 1 23553
East South Central 0.06 0.24 0 1 23553
West South Central 0.13 0.34 0 1 23553
Mountain 0.05 0.21 0 1 23553
Paciﬁc 0.18 0.38 0 1 23553
1982 0.16 0.37 0 1 23553
1990 0.29 0.46 0 1 23553
1995 0.54 0.5 0 1 23553
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Data type Source
Public opinion General Social Survey
National Opinion Research Center (NORC)
Drug use National Household Survey on Drug Abuse
National Institute on Drug Abuse
Party aﬃliation Fraction of members of the state house, state senate
governor that are of a political party
Population, racial Area Resource File
composition, unemployment Department of Health and Human Services
rate, and income per capita
Church membership Churches and Church Membership in the United States
Glenmary Research Center
State liberalism Berry et al. [1998] (ICPSR 1208)
State imprisonments The National Corrections Reporting Program
(ICPSR 2017, 2613, 3029, 3339)
Federal imprisonments Federal court cases: Integrated data base
1970-2000 (ICPSR 8429)
Drug deaths Multiple cause of death in the U.S.
National Center for Health Statistics
High school drug use Monitoring the Future
U.S. attorney experience Boylan [forthcoming]
Table 5: Correspondence between survey variables and district variables
Survey variables District variables
Democrat % of state legislature Democrat
Republican % of state legislature Republican
Population size District population density
Black % of district population black
Conservative State measure of liberalism
Religious aﬃliation # of adherents for religious aﬃliation in district
population in district
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
% federal imprisonments 0.2 0.16 0 0.97 1204
Drug deaths per 1,000,000 18.82 24.21 0 286.01 1129
High school drug use 0.74 0.15 0.25 0.94 552
Federal imprisonments per 100,000 6.16 5.9 0 55.59 1204
State imprisonments per 100,000 37.66 34.01 0.26 191.56 1204
Public opinion 0.31 0.06 0.16 0.48 1204
Inc. per cap. (10,000s) 2.31 0.46 1.27 5.01 1204
Senators per 1,000,000 0.58 0.67 0.06 4.41 1204
Border district 0.08 0.28 0 1 1204
U.S. attorney experience 3.36 2.45 0 13.25 1204
1983 0.03 0.16 0 1 1204
1984 0.05 0.21 0 1 1204
1985 0.06 0.23 0 1 1204
1986 0.06 0.23 0 1 1204
1987 0.06 0.24 0 1 1204
1988 0.06 0.24 0 1 1204
1989 0.06 0.24 0 1 1204
1990 0.06 0.24 0 1 1204
1991 0.07 0.25 0 1 1204
1992 0.06 0.24 0 1 1204
1993 0.06 0.24 0 1 1204
1994 0.06 0.24 0 1 1204
1995 0.06 0.24 0 1 1204
1996 0.06 0.24 0 1 1204
1997 0.06 0.24 0 1 1204
1998 0.06 0.25 0 1 1204
1999 0.06 0.24 0 1 1204
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Perc. impr. fed. Deaths Use Fed. impr. State impr.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Public opinion .508 34.897 .559 4.753 -19.334
(.166)¤¤ (20.237) (.106)¤¤¤ (5.307) (25.828)
Inc. per cap. (10,000s) -.077 16.538 .015 -2.094 9.618
(.027)¤¤ (3.17)¤¤¤ (.014) (.892)¤ (4.494)¤
Senators per 1,000,000 .081 -2.524 .012 .202 -10.943
(.017)¤¤¤ (1.743) (.01) (.559) (2.843)¤¤¤
Border district .139 31.994 -.01 8.244 12.191
(.05)¤¤ (4.99)¤¤¤ (.018) (1.617)¤¤¤ (8.192)
U.S. attorney experience .003 .109 .0004 .12 -.211
(.001)¤ (.168) (.002) (.04)¤¤ (.192)
Obs. 1204 1129 552 1204 1204
R2 .202 .505 .829 .238 .371
½ .659 .616 .593 .745 .806
Notes: District random-eﬀects linear model with an AR(1) disturbance. In each regression
the unit of observation is the district/year. In Regression (1) the dependent variable is the
percentage of drug imprisonments that are federal. In Regression (2) the dependent
variable is number of individuals who die from drug abuse and dependency per 1,000,000
inhabitants. In Regression (3) the dependent variable is the fraction of high school seniors
who have used an illicit drug. In Regression (4) the dependent variable is the number of
federal drug imprisonments per 100,000 inhabitants. In Regression (5) the dependent
variable is the number of state and local imprisonment per 100,000 inhabitants. ‘Public
opinion’ is the predicted percentage of the district that favors the de-criminalization of
marijuana. The coeﬃcients for the year ﬁxed-eﬀects are omitted from the table. ¤
signiﬁcant at the 5% level; ¤¤ signiﬁcant at the 1% level; ¤¤¤ signiﬁcant at the 0:1% level.
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Perc. impr. fed. Deaths Use Fed. impr. State impr.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Democrat (¡) -.31 -286.624 .054 7.588 -272.822
(1.002) (122.004)¤ (.748) (32.469) (152.327)
Republican (¡) -.306 -281.606 .097 8.989 -276.776
(1.004) (122.2)¤ (.749) (32.529) (152.592)
Population density (+) -.003 4.6 0 .049 2.1
(.007) (.503)¤¤¤ (.003) (.235) (.876)¤
Age between 25 and 44 (¡) .311 26.569 -.203 10.691 -11.847
(1.32) (123.662) (.876) (46.662) (203.228)
Age between 35 and 44 (¡) 2.018 -103.957 .059 -12.882 -705.856
(1.195) (107.427) (.719) (42.189) (177.249)¤¤¤
Age 65 or older (¡) 1.427 16.224 -.976 30.002 -219.954
(1.118) (104.321) (.738) (39.619) (172.61)
< 9 years education (¡) -.002 1.328 -.001 -.003 .609
(.003) (.334)¤¤¤ (.002) (.119) (.544)
¸ 4 years college (+) .006 .765 -.005 .009 -2.458
(.005) (.409) (.003)¤ (.16) (.657)¤¤¤
Percentage black (¡) -.314 -.872 -.111 3.434 85.337
(.159)¤ (11.819) (.078) (5.644) (20.451)¤¤¤
Unemployment rate (+) -.255 -78.373 -.431 -3.629 78.583
(.332) (39.673)¤ (.315) (10.919) (51.943)
Conservatism (¡) -.022 1.893 -.039 -.234 1.513
(.009)¤¤ (1.041) (.008)¤¤¤ (.277) (1.273)
Catholic (¡) -.089 -27.623 -.054 -1.838 7.141
(.131) (9.833)¤¤ (.067) (4.63) (17.09)
Jewish (+) -.537 20.938 -.052 -48.915 -32.829
(1.002) (82.244) (.44) (35.616) (141.506)
Non-denom. Protest. (¡) -.116 -5.417 -.178 -9.959 -31.27
(.197) (14.67) (.106) (6.994) (25.785)
Baptist (¡) -.24 -101.431 -.023 -2.999 -15.489
(.363) (28.013)¤¤¤ (.196) (12.866) (47.886)
Denomin. Protest. (¡) -.302 -171.355 -.376 -25.461 -96.577
(.415) (31.29)¤¤¤ (.202) (14.719) (54.456)
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Perc. impr. fed. Deaths Use Fed. impr. State impr.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Inc. per cap. (10,000s) -.093 -1.464 .032 -1.874 17.252
(.037)¤ (4.054) (.028) (1.252) (5.747)¤¤
Senators per 1,000,000 .059 -.114 .014 .443 -4.028
(.017)¤¤¤ (1.255) (.01) (.59) (2.163)
Border district .184 -.393 .0007 9.021 -4.234
(.055)¤¤¤ (4.285) (.025) (1.929)¤¤¤ (7.207)
U.S. attorney experience .003 .097 .0007 .116 -.242
(.001)¤ (.165) (.002) (.041)¤¤ (.194)
Obs. 1204 1129 552 1204 1204
R2 .297 .715 .847 .258 .606
½ .634 .578 .556 .704 .775
Notes: District random-eﬀects linear model with an AR(1) disturbance. In each regression
the unit of observation is the district/year. The sign included in parenthesis next to a
variable denote the eﬀect of that variable on the likelihood that the individual favors the
legalization of marijuana (i.e., the sign of the corresponding coeﬃcient in Regression (1),
Table 2). The coeﬃcients for the year ﬁxed-eﬀects are omitted from the table. ¤ signiﬁcant
at the 5% level; ¤¤ signiﬁcant at the 1% level; ¤¤¤ signiﬁcant at the 0:1% level.
Table 9: Summary statistics for county level data
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
% federal imprisonments 0.11 0.22 0 1 8931
Drug deaths 2.76 19.97 0 732 8931
Federal imprisonments 7.27 42.78 0 1648 8931
State imprisonments 67.57 428.45 0 16093 8931
Public opinion 0.32 0.06 0.09 0.55 8931
County inc. per cap. (10,000s) 2.18 0.54 0.42 8.37 8931
State inc. per cap. (10,000s) 2.6 0.33 1.92 3.65 8931
Senators per 1,000,000 0.49 0.52 0.06 3.27 8931
Border district 0.06 0.23 0 1 8931
U.S. attorney experience 3.37 1.57 0 6.75 8931
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mates
Perc. impr. fed. Deaths Fed. impr. State impr.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Public opinion .887 18.462 1.639 .903
(.146)¤¤¤ (.552)¤¤¤ (.309)¤¤¤ (.128)¤¤¤
County inc. per cap. (10,000s) .064 -.007 -.039 -.072
(.017)¤¤¤ (.049) (.038) (.013)¤¤¤
State inc. per cap. (10,000s) -.154 -4.036 .64 .284
(.029)¤¤¤ (.099)¤¤¤ (.059)¤¤¤ (.022)¤¤¤
Senators per 1,000,000 .022 -.529 .043 -.36
(.017) (.059)¤¤¤ (.054) (.036)¤¤¤
Border district .244 .646 3.111 -.032
(.035)¤¤¤ (.164)¤¤¤ (.15)¤¤¤ (.099)
U.S. attorney experience .015 -.067 -.0003 .008
(.003)¤¤¤ (.006)¤¤¤ (.003) (.001)¤¤¤
Obs. 8931 12372 12372 10424
Log likelihood -4070.602 -15192.97 -20549.55 -36056.5
Notes: Tobit (1) and Poisson (2–4) regressions. The Poisson regressions are weighted by
the county population. The unit of observation is the county-year, for the years 1996-1999.
All regressions include year ﬁxed-eﬀects and county random-eﬀects. ¤ signiﬁcant at the 5%
level; ¤¤ signiﬁcant at the 1% level; ¤¤¤ signiﬁcant at the 0:1% level.
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Perc. impr. fed. Deaths Fed. impr. State impr.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Democrat (¡) -1.575 -6.036 4.655 2.072
(1.402) (1.954)¤¤ (1.564)¤¤ (.464)¤¤¤
Republican (¡) -1.507 -4.969 5.192 2.138
(1.403) (1.988)¤ (1.572)¤¤¤ (.475)¤¤¤
Population density (+) .0009 -.004 -.04 -.02
(.005) (.017) (.031) (.008)¤¤
Age between 25 and 44 (¡) .053 21.045 -5.604 -4.42
(.433) (1.296)¤¤¤ (1.728)¤¤ (.781)¤¤¤
Age between 35 and 44 (¡) -.711 -10.093 -1.967 -.731
(.365) (1.164)¤¤¤ (1.484) (.746)
Age 65 or older (¡) .144 19.688 -1.854 -3.607
(.423) (1.292)¤¤¤ (1.557) (.735)¤¤¤
< 9 years education (¡) .007 -.038 .049 -.036
(.002)¤¤¤ (.007)¤¤¤ (.007)¤¤¤ (.003)¤¤¤
¸ 4 years college (+) .01 .048 .011 -.027
(.002)¤¤¤ (.006)¤¤¤ (.006) (.003)¤¤¤
Percentage black (¡) .061 -.073 2.302 2.798
(.06) (.214) (.265)¤¤¤ (.14)¤¤¤
Unemployment rate (+) .325 9.991 -2.934 -.145
(.299) (.882)¤¤¤ (.515)¤¤¤ (.255)
Conservatism (¡) -.048 -.235 -.006 .022
(.014)¤¤¤ (.032)¤¤¤ (.023) (.009)¤
Catholic (¡) -.017 -.272 -1.314 .116
(.071) (.228) (.204)¤¤¤ (.138)
Jewish (+) -.082 19.675 8.037 9.724
(.692) (2.322)¤¤¤ (2.298)¤¤¤ (.865)¤¤¤
Non-denom. Protest. (¡) -.409 -1.621 -1.511 -.094
(.114)¤¤¤ (.337)¤¤¤ (.403)¤¤¤ (.248)
Baptist (¡) -.585 -.039 -1.484 2.253
(.084)¤¤¤ (.322) (.336)¤¤¤ (.191)¤¤¤
Denomin. Protest. (¡) -.636 -6.887 -3.06 -4.08
(.141)¤¤¤ (.619)¤¤¤ (.476)¤¤¤ (.319)¤¤¤
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Perc. impr. fed. Deaths Fed. impr. State impr.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
County inc. per cap. (10,000s) -.014 -.529 -.053 -.023
(.026) (.058)¤¤¤ (.045) (.015)
State inc. per cap. (10,000s) -.173 -1.414 .576 .233
(.033)¤¤¤ (.081)¤¤¤ (.07)¤¤¤ (.031)¤¤¤
Senators per 1,000,000 .006 -.1 .274 .004
(.017) (.043)¤ (.059)¤¤¤ (.036)
Border district .129 .325 2.73 .373
(.041)¤¤ (.109)¤¤ (.184)¤¤¤ (.096)¤¤¤
U.S. attorney experience .023 .0005 .003 .007
(.004)¤¤¤ (.006) (.003) (.001)¤¤¤
Obs. 8931 12372 12372 10424
Log likelihood -3990.122 -14866.83 -20385.5 -35439.69
Notes: Tobit (1) and Poisson (2–4) regressions. The Poisson regressions are weighted by
the county population. The unit of observation is the county-year, for the years 1996-1999.
All regressions include year ﬁxed-eﬀects and county random-eﬀects. ¤ signiﬁcant at the 5%
level; ¤¤ signiﬁcant at the 1% level; ¤¤¤ signiﬁcant at the 0:1% level.
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